Introduction : friendly tyrants -- Autocrats and armies -- Two revolutions -- Exporting revolution -- Bolstering counterrevolution -- Commissars and coups -- Nonpartisan praetorians -- Hollow armies -- After the Cold War -- Conclusion : learning from the past

"Throughout the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union strategized to prop up friendly dictatorships abroad. Today, it is commonly assumed that the two superpowers' military aid enabled the survival of allied autocrats, from Taiwan's Chiang Kai-shek to Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam. In Up in Arms, political scientist Adam E. Casey rebuts the received wisdom: Cold War-era aid to autocracies often backfired. Casey draws on extensive original data to show that, despite billions poured into friendly regimes, US-backed dictators lasted no longer in power than those without outside help. In fact, American aid regularly destabilized autocratic regimes. The United States encouraged the establishment of strong, independent armies like its own, which then often incubated coups. By contrast, Soviet aid incentivized the subordination of the army to the ruling regime, neutralizing the threat of military takeover. Ultimately, Casey concludes, it is subservient militaries-not outside aid-that help autocrats maintain power. In an era of renewed great power competition, Up in Arms offers invaluable insights into the unforeseen consequences of overseas meddling, revealing how military aid can help pull down dictators as often as it props them up"--